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PROLOGUE
While this Note was undergoing the last stages of revision before
publication, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals published its decision in the
appeal by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the Southern
District of New York’s judgment in Sokolow v. PLO.1 The Second Circuit
disagreed with the district court and vacated the judgment against the PLO.2
Specifically, the court held that the district court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendants regarding the claims brought against them.3
This Note will briefly cover the recent decision, but the remainder of the
Note will remain as originally written as other cases are still pending an
appeal which may reintroduce this issue, or if this issue is raised to the
Supreme Court.
In the opinion, the court first addressed the three requirements of
exercising personal jurisdiction.4 First, service of process on the defendant
by the plaintiff must have been proper.5 Second, such service of process
must fulfill a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction to be effective.6 Lastly,
such “exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional Due
Process principles.”7 As the defendants did not dispute the first two
requirements, the court only analyzed whether the third prong was met;
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants was consistent with
the Constitution.8
Before analyzing due process under the Constitution, the court addressed
three threshold issues, some of which were addressed in this Note. First, the
court noted that the defendants had not waived or forfeited their objection to
the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction because they consistently
raised the issue.9 Second, the PLO and Palestinian Authority (PA) did have
due process rights because they were a non-sovereign entity and neither had
been recognized as a sovereign state by the United States, whose
determination is conclusive.10 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took an
alternate viewpoint on this issue than what is described in this Note, which
advocated that the court could deem the PA and PLO not to have due process
1

Waldman v. PLO, 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 322.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 327.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. (quoting Licci ex rel Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d
Cir. 2012)).
8
Id. at 328.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 329.
2
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rights. Third, the court recognized that a due process analysis was
substantially the same under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, with the principal difference being that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a court can only consider all of the defendant’s contacts with
the forum state, while under the Fifth Amendment, the court can consider all
of the defendant’s contacts in the United States.11 Here, the court again
analyzed this issue differently from this Note by judging the test to be
roughly the same under both legal views.
Rather than review the court’s entire analysis of the reasonableness of
exercising personal jurisdiction and the minimum contacts of the PA and
PLO, this section will briefly cover the parts of the Second Circuit’s opinion
that related to this Note. Mainly, the court held that the Daimler decision
applied not just to corporations, but to all “entities,” and therefore, it applied
to the defendants in this case.12 The court also rejected the idea that the
defendants’ contacts throughout the United States were enough to subject it
to general jurisdiction because “there is no doubt that the ‘far larger
quantum’ of the defendants’ activities too place in Palestine.”13 In regards to
the “exceptional cases” referenced in Daimler, the Second Circuit rejected
that this was such a case.14 The court stated that such exceptional cases were
ones like in Perkins v. Benguet, where the defendants were temporarily
located in the United States due to World War II.15 Nor were the attacks in
this case, in the court’s opinion, sufficiently aimed at the United States to
allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction.16
Of course, this decision by the Second Circuit eliminates the split
between the courts that forms the centerpiece of this Note. The judgments of
the District Court of D.C. are still awaiting appeal, though. If the D.C.
Circuit decides the issue differently from the Second Circuit, then this Note
will once again be an important discussion on the issues at play. Even so, the
author hopes that this Note will provide useful background information
regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants in terrorism litigation
and other jurisdictional issues.

11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 330 (citing Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 28 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 338.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is an inescapable aspect of the modern global political
landscape. It can be as “small” as a shooting of Jewish worshippers
attempting to visit a holy tomb or as “big” as a wave of suicide bombings
across an entire country. The United States has felt the effects at home: from
shootings by extremists linked to a new threat like the Islamic State, to a
layered, orchestrated plot to strike at the symbols of our nation in New York
and Washington. Some of these attacks are carried out by lone wolves,
independent of support or funding. Others are part of consolidated strategies
pushing for political change or disruption.
Plaintiffs in New York and Washington, D.C. have taken it upon
themselves to pursue the perpetrators and supporters of these attacks.17 For
decades, litigation has sought some measure of remedy for the victims and
their families. In particular, the PA and PLO have been named as defendants
in American courts, called to answer allegations that their organizations
supported and controlled such attacks.
In New York, plaintiffs have won major victories with record punitive
damage awards.18 In Washington, D.C., though, plaintiffs have found their
cases dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.19 The United States
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman20 led the courts
in Washington to conclude that they could not exercise general personal
jurisdiction over such foreign defendants because they were not “essentially
at home” in the forum. In New York, the court found it could exercise
personal jurisdiction in spite of the Daimler decision, holding that there was
jurisdiction under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991 (ATA) and that this
jurisdiction fell under the Court’s range of possible exceptional cases in
Daimler. Currently, all these decisions are on appeal at their respective
circuit courts.
This Note will examine the history of personal jurisdiction in the United
States and its effects on this litigation. Further, it will review the evolution
of anti-terrorism litigation over the last few decades, looking at legislation
and its effects on the litigation of terrorism. Next, this Note will analyze the
cases pending in the Southern District of New York and the District Court of
17
See Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. Palestinian
Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 2015); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp.
3d 237 (D.D.C. 2015); Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation (Sokolow II), No. 04 Civ. 597, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168114 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).
18
Benjamin Weiser, Palestinian Groups Are Found Liable at Manhattan Terror Trial, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/nyregion/damages-awarded-in-te
rror-case-against-palestinian-groups.html?_r=0.
19
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 19; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 37; Klieman, 82 F. Supp. at 237.
20
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
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D.C. Finally, this Note will consider the future of this litigation and the
possible avenues the circuit courts may follow in deciding these cases. In
particular, the courts will have to examine if Due Process rights even apply
to the PA and PLO. The courts will also have to determine if the Daimler
and Fourteenth Amendment analysis used by the D.C. courts was appropriate
or if a Fifth Amendment analysis is required. Lastly, the courts will likely
look at the Supreme Court’s recognition of exceptional cases under Daimler
and whether the PA and PLO fit into that category of defendants.
II. GENERAL JURISDICTION, DAIMLER, AND THE END OF SIGNIFICANT
CONTACTS
A. A History of Personal Jurisdiction
The Daimler decision is the latest in the long string of cases read by first
year law students. Since the Court’s ruling in Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court
has produced numerous opinions attempting to narrow down exactly when a
court has jurisdiction over a defendant. In Pennoyer, the Court made the
landmark decision that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”21
This established the general limit under the Fourteenth Amendment on the
exercise of personal jurisdiction extraterritorially, though that strict approach
has loosened over time with the advances in “technology of transportation
and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business
activity.”22
The first major opinion that expanded a State’s ability to exercise
personal jurisdiction extraterritorially came in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.23 There, the Court held Due Process requires the defendant to
have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”24 As the Court noted later, “the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty
of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern
of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”25 The importance of International
Shoe is that the lawsuit must arise from the activities of the defendant in the
forum.26 Today, this is known as specific jurisdiction.27 Though the Court
21
22
23
24
25
26

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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avoided giving a detailed rule on what kind of acts or connections allow the
exercise of specific jurisdiction, it recognized that “the commission of some
single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state” could potentially
be enough.28 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens commented that what is
needed is fair notice, which “includes fair warning that a particular activity
may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”29 The Due
Process Clause requires this fair notice in order to “[give] a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure
their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.”30
International Shoe also distinguished between the exercise of jurisdiction
over a defendant in a lawsuit originating from their actions in the forum state
and the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when their
“operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature” that
lawsuits arising from actions or dealings outside the state are justified.31
Later, the Court would hold that a state could only exercise this “general
jurisdiction” over foreign defendants “when their affiliations with the State
[were] so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home
The seminal case on “general jurisdiction
in the forum State.”32
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to
suit in the forum” is Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.33 In that case,
the defendant corporation was incorporated in the Philippines but left the
country during the Japanese occupation of the islands in World War II.34
The company’s president moved to Ohio where he maintained an office and
from where he oversaw the business.35 The plaintiff sued the company over
a claim that did not arise in Ohio and was not related to the defendant’s
actions or connections in that state.36 The Court held that due process would

27

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
29
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984) (holding that defendant’s intentional actions aimed at the forum State of California
were enough that he might reasonably have expected to be sued there). But see J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (rejecting that a defendant’s predicting that its
goods would reach the forum was enough to exercise specific jurisdiction and requiring
“purposeful availment”).
30
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). See also Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (holding that the fair notice requirement
is satisfied where defendants have “purposefully directed” the activities at the forum State).
31
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
32
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
33
Id. at 2856.
34
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
35
Id. at 447–48.
36
Id. at 447.
28
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not be violated by the exercise of jurisdiction over the corporate defendant37
because, it later noted, “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary,
place of business.”38
The next case to clarify the exercise of general jurisdiction was
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.39 The plaintiffs in the
case were the survivors and representatives of four American citizens killed
in a helicopter crash in Peru.40 The defendants had contacts with Texas, but
they were limited to one trip by the CEO to Houston, the purchasing of
helicopters and equipment from a company in Texas, and sending personnel
to Texas for training.41 The Court refused to classify these connections as
the type of “continuous and systematic general business contacts” necessary
for the exercise of general jurisdiction.42
In 2011, the Court again addressed the restrictions on general jurisdiction
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, a case arising from the
deaths of two North Carolina residents in a bus accident near Paris.43 The
defendants were Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation that operated tire
plants in North Carolina, as well as three foreign subsidiaries.44 Though
Goodyear USA did not contest to jurisdiction, the foreign subsidiaries did so
on the grounds that the small percentage of tires they produced that entered
the stream of commerce and were distributed in North Carolina were not
enough to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction.45 The Court held that
such contacts were inadequate and “[did] not establish the ‘continuous and
systematic’ affiliation necessary to empower the North Carolina courts to
entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation’s contacts with the
State.”46 The Court specifically noted that the foreign defendants could not
be described “in [any] sense [as] at home in North Carolina.”47

37

Id. at 448.
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 n.11 (1984).
39
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
40
Id. at 410.
41
Id. at 416.
42
Id.
43
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 2850–51.
46
Id. at 2851. See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(holding that mere awareness that the goods defendant has manufactured, sold, and delivered
outside the country would reach the forum state through the stream of commerce did not
constitute minimum contacts such as to justify the exercise of jurisdiction).
47
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
38

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/17/2017 2:57 PM

HOLDING SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM ACCOUNTABLE

107

B. Daimler and its Effect
Most recently, the Supreme Court unanimously clarified its position on
the exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign corporate defendants in
Daimler AG v. Bauman.48 In a holding that has had far-reaching
consequences, the Court reiterated the rule from Goodyear that a court could
only assert general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant “when the
corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so
constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.’ ”49 The plaintiffs alleged that a subsidiary of Daimler AG, MercedesBenz Argentina (MB Argentina), worked with the Argentinian government
to “kidnap, detain, torture, and kill” their own employees during a period of
Argentinian history known as the “Dirty War.”50 The plaintiffs claimed that
jurisdiction was merited through the California contacts of another subsidiary
of Daimler, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA).51 MBUSA is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey that distributes
vehicles for sale to independent dealerships across the country, including in
California.52
The Court held that Daimler was not essentially at home in California and
therefore was not subject to general jurisdiction there,53 reasoning that
subjecting the defendant to general jurisdiction in California based on its
limited contacts there would subject it to general jurisdiction in every State,
thus making it difficult for the corporation “to structure [its] primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render [it] liable to suit.”54
However, the Court did not say that the place of incorporation and
principal place of business were the only places a defendant could be subject
to general jurisdiction, only that those were “paradigm all-purpose forums.”55
This leaves open the possibility of an exceptional case where a corporation’s
connections with a forum state other than “its formal place of incorporation
or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to
render the corporation at home in that State.”56 However, the Court
dismissed the plaintiff’s proposal that a corporation be subject to general

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746.
Id. at 751 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 761–62 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472).
Id. at 760 (referencing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853).
Id. at 761 n.19.
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jurisdiction in any state where the corporation “engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business.”57
C. What Exactly is “At Home”?
What, exactly, does it mean to be “at home”? In Daimler, the Court
reiterated the paradigmatic forums for general jurisdiction are the
individual’s domicile and the corporation’s place of incorporation or
principal place of business.58 The latter is derived from International Shoe,
which referred to all-purpose corporate jurisdiction in “instances in which
the continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.”59 A corporation’s principal place of
business is “where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation’s activities.”60 The Court avoided applying a “more general
business activities test” where lower courts have looked at the “total amount
of business activities that the corporation conducts [in the forum] and
determine[d] whether they are ‘significantly larger’ than in the next-ranking
State.”61 However, in Daimler, the rule was expanded and general
jurisdiction now requires “an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their
entirety, nationwide, and worldwide.”62 This leaves an ambiguous rule for
litigants where they must evaluate not only the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state, but compare the contacts with the forum state in some
unspecified way to the defendant’s contacts elsewhere.63
More recently, the Second Circuit clarified this rule and reiterated “that a
corporation may nonetheless be subject to general jurisdiction in a state only
where its contacts are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ judged against the
corporation’s national and global activities, that it is ‘essentially at home’ in
that state.”64 The Court explained that “[a]side from an ‘exceptional
case,’ . . . a corporation is at home (and thus subject to general jurisdiction,

57

Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents 16–17 & nn.7–8).
Id. The Court cites two cases, Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) and Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917) where a corporation’s continuous
operations in a forum State were enough to allow the exercise of general jurisdiction, but
dismissed them because they were decided in an “era dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial
thinking” and “should not attract heavy reliance today.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.18.
59
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
60
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010).
61
Id. at 93.
62
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762, n.20.
63
Id. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
64
Gucci Am. Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Daimler,
134 S. Ct. at 761–62).
58
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consistent with due process) only in a state that is the company’s formal
place of incorporation or its principal place of business.”65
Justice Sotomayor criticized the Court’s reasoning in Daimler, remarking
that the case should have been resolved under a forum non conveniens
analysis, and concurred only in the judgment.66 In her view, the Daimler
reasoning created a situation where multinational corporations are “too big
for general jurisdiction.”67 She also criticized the Court’s examination of
Daimler AG’s contacts with fora beyond California as being inconsistent
In Perkins,
with general jurisdiction and due process precedent.68
Helicopteros, and Goodyear the Court’s analysis to determine the
appropriateness of the exercise of general jurisdiction included only those
defendants’ contacts and holdings in the forum states.69 This is consistent
with the reasoning of International Shoe that where a defendant “invoke[s]
the benefits and protections of a State . . . the State acquires the authority to
subject the company to suit in its courts.”70 But, inexplicably, the Court
followed a path “untethered from this rationale” by analyzing the corporate
defendant’s contacts in places other than the forum.71 The Court’s new rule
requires that defendants possess not only “continuous and systematic
contacts” in the forum, but that “those contacts must also surpass some
unspecified level when viewed in comparison to the company’s ‘nationwide
In Justice Sotomayor’s view of the
and worldwide’ activities.”72
International Shoe rule, the nature of the global economy has evolved to a
point where a foreign defendant could sufficiently enjoy the benefits of
multiple states to be considered “essentially at home” in each of them.73
Such broad jurisdiction is merely an “inevitable consequence” of the
International Shoe rule being applied in a modern global interconnected
65
Id. The Second Circuit’s examination of general jurisdiction is relevant because the
District Court of D.C. uses this as their reference for application of general jurisdiction over
the Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organization.
66
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
67
Id. Justice Sotomayor compares this to the recent phenomenon where banks and
corporations are deemed “too big to fail.”
68
Id. at 767–70.
69
Id. at 767–68. In fact, as Justice Sotomayor notes, in Perkins, the Court recognized that the
corporation’s contacts in the forum state “were not substantial in comparison to its contacts
elsewhere.” Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 341 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)).
70
Id. at 768.
71
Id. See also Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 721, 742 (1988) (“We should not treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely
because they carry on more substantial business in other states . . . . [T]he amount of activity
elsewhere seems virtually irrelevant to . . . the imposition of general jurisdiction over a
defendant.”). Interestingly, this article was cited and relied on by the majorities of both
Daimler and Goodyear.
72
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 771.
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economy.74 The majority rejected this view and the prospect of an analysis
based on reasonableness factors on the grounds that it was unpredictable for
the company and judicially inefficient.75
III. CIVIL LITIGATION UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT OF 1991
A. Litigation Under the Alien Torts Statute
Anti-terrorism litigation is a relatively new brand of cases. It has been
used both as a way for families of victims to receive compensation and as a
way to influence those who commit or support terrorism. The first cases
were brought under the Alien Torts Statute (ATS), which provided district
courts with jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a
tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”76 The first major case attempting to hold the PLO responsible for
terrorist attacks, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, did not provide much
guidance or precedent because each judge on the D.C. Circuit’s panel wrote
his own separate concurring opinion.77 Judge Edwards refused jurisdiction
on the grounds that the PLO was not a “recognized member of the
community of nations”78 and that the lack of consensus in the international
community on the legitimacy of terrorism indicated that it was not a
violation of the laws of nations.79 Judge Bork also took issue with the fact
that there was no international agreement defining terrorism and therefore
couldn’t be considered a violation of customary international law.80 He
reasoned that there was no cause of action to sue under international law or
under the ATS.81 Judge Robb invoked the political question doctrine in his
concurrence, reasoning that this issue was wholly outside of the court’s
purview.82 This result left the issue unresolved and ripe for further litigation.

74

Id.
Id. at 762 n.20. Such reasonableness factors as those identified in Asahi include “the
burden on the defendant,” “the interests of the forum State,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,” “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies,” and “the procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are
affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–15.
76
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
77
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
78
Id. at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring).
79
Id. at 796.
80
Id. at 806–07 (Bork, J., concurring).
81
Id. at 799. In Judge Bork’s view, the ATS was purely jurisdictional and did not create
any cause of action for the plaintiffs. Id. at 813.
82
Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
75
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The next case arose from the tragic killing of wheelchair-bound Leon
Klinghoffer in the 1985 forcible seizure of the Italian passenger liner Achille
Lauro.83 This time, the district court found subject matter jurisdiction under
both admiralty jurisdiction84 and the Death on the High Seas Act.85 The
court justified its exercise of personal jurisdiction under state law based on
the PLO’s contacts in New York through its permanent observer to the
U.N.86 Most importantly, the court rejected the idea that suits against the
PLO were nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.87 The court
reiterated that the doctrine excluded “political questions, not . . . political
cases.”88 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court on the political
question issue, but remanded on service of process and personal jurisdiction
grounds, holding that “only those activities not conducted in furtherance of
the PLO’s observer status may properly be considered as a basis of
jurisdiction.”89
Litigation under the ATS took a significant hit in 2013 with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.90 In what seems
like a harsh setback to human rights groups,91 the Court held the presumption
against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS because “nothing in the text of
the statute suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under
it to have extraterritorial reach.”92 Though this is a significant limiting
decision on the ATS, there are still avenues for victims of human rights
abuses abroad to pursue.93
The PA has also been sued under the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA),94 which provides a cause of action for acts of torture and
83

Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
85
Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858–59. See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30301–30308 (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
86
Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 862–63.
87
Id. at 859–60.
88
Id. at 860 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
89
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 51–53 (2d Cir. 1991).
90
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
91
See Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for
Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business is a New (PostKiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2014) (discussing the consequences of
Kiobel on human rights litigation and the ability of victims to seek remedies from
transnational corporations).
92
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665. See also Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
has none.”).
93
See Roxanna Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Future of U.S. Human Right
Litigation Post-Kiobel, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1495 (2014) (outlining the difficulties of post-Kiobel
litigation and the avenues still available to victims).
94
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
84

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

112

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

5/17/2017 2:57 PM

[Vol. 45:99

extrajudicial killing.95 However, the Supreme Court rejected the application
of the TVPA to the PA on the grounds that the statute only applied to acts
committed by individuals, not organizations.96
B. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991
In the wake of Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer, Congress passed the AntiTerrorism Act of 1991 (ATA),97 which creates a private cause of action for
any U.S. national injured by an act of terrorism and provides that successful
plaintiffs “shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost
of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”98 This act was passed, in part, because
many members of Congress felt that jurisdiction should be broadened so it
was not only in fortuitous cases like Klinghoffer that such suits could go
forward.99
Following a deadly attack by a gunman at a bat mitzvah in Israel, the
family of an American citizen killed in the attack sued the PA and PLO
under the ATA.100 The defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds that
they enjoyed sovereign immunity and that the claims were nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine.101 The court rejected the defendants’
sovereign immunity argument because they failed to sufficiently establish
that Palestine is a state under international law and because the United States
had not recognized Palestine, it was not “entitled in our courts to be accorded
all the privileges and immunities of sovereign states. . . .”102 The court also
rejected the nonjusticiability argument by following the same reasoning from
Klinghoffer, reasoning that a terrorist attack was just like any common law
tort claim103 and nonjusticiability only applied to “political questions” not
“political cases.”104 After losing on the motion to dismiss, the PA and PLO

95

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a)(1), 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
Mohamad, 132 S. Ct. at 1709 (“[T]he TVPA’s text evinces a clear intent not to subject
non-sovereign organizations to liability.”).
97
137 CONG. REC. E1583 (May 2, 1991).
98
18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
99
Adam N. Schupack, Note, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation Against
Terrorism, 60 DUKE L.J. 207, 213 (2010) (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S8143 (1991) (statement of
Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims
and it empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation . . . .”)).
100
Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
101
Id. at 427.
102
Id. at 429–30.
103
Id. at 449 (citing Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49–50).
104
Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
96
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stopped litigating this case and the court entered a default judgment of over
$192 million.105
Knox I was one of many cases with similar outcomes against the PA and
PLO.106 In response, Mahmoud Abbas, the newly elected president of the
PA, announced a new intention to litigate suits like Knox I.107 In response to
this change, the court granted the PA’s motion for relief and vacated the
judgment.108 Following this, the PA quietly settled the suit with the family
of the victim for an undisclosed amount.109
These early cases under the ATA show some overall trends. The political
question doctrine and the nonjusticiability of claims for terrorist attacks are
no longer issues; the court now treats these claims as ordinary tort claims.
The courts have also continued to reject the sovereign immunity arguments
of the PA and PLO on grounds that they fail to meet the international
standards of statehood and have not been officially recognized by the
executive branch. The recent developments in these cases have also shown a
willingness by the PA and PLO to litigate these claims and allow them to be
adjudicated on the merits. Lastly, these cases have proven to be a somewhat
effective tool against terrorism. Litigation under the ATA can be a lengthy,
but effective way for families and victims to receive compensation.
IV. APPLICATION OF DAIMLER TO UNINCORPORATED, NON-SOVEREIGN
ENTITIES
A. Case Law in the District Court of D.C.
Before examining the recent cases in the District Court of D.C., it is
important to explore some earlier decisions in that jurisdiction that might
explain how and why the court ruled the way it did.
In 2005, prior to Kiobel and Daimler, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit heard Mwani v. Bin Laden, where the court
concluded that specific jurisdiction was proper when defendants
“purposefully directed” their activities at the United States and the litigation
105
Knox v. PLO (Knox II), 248 F.R.D. 420, 423–24 (2008). Note the size of the judgment
was due to the allowance of triple damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).
106
See, e.g., Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005); Sokolow v. PLO (Sokolow I), 583
F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp. 2d 153
(D.D.C. 2006); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 422 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C.
2006); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004).
107
Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 424.
108
Id. at 433.
109
Melissa Apter, PA settles with terror victim, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Feb. 18,
2010, 12:07 AM), http://www.jta.org/2010/02/18/news-opinion/united-states/pa-settles-withterror-victim.
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resulted from injuries to the plaintiffs “as a result of those actions.”110 In this
case, the plaintiffs were victims, families of victims, and businesses harmed
in the 1998 terrorist attack at the American embassy in Nairobi.111 The
circuit court held that the district court could exercise specific jurisdiction
because defendants Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had “ ‘purposefully
directed their activities at residents’ of the United States.”112 This was
because the defendants had “engaged in unabashedly malignant actions
directed at [and] felt in this forum.”113 The plaintiffs’ injuries also clearly
arose from the defendant’s activities and therefore bin Laden and al Qaeda
had “fair warning that their activities would subject them to the jurisdiction
of the United States.”114 The court, however, did affirm the dismissal of
claims against defendant Afghanistan because the claims against the nation
did not fall within the exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.115
Following this decision, another important memorandum opinion from
the District of D.C. authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Hamas for terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv.116 Like in Mwani, the court found
the defendant, Hamas, subject to specific jurisdiction and sought to use the
long-arm provision of Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.117 Rule 4(k)(2) “permits a federal court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant (1) for a claim arising under federal law, (2)
where a summons has been served, (3) if the defendant is not subject to the
jurisdiction of any single state court, (4) provided that the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution (and laws) of the United

110

Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005). It is important to point out that the
plaintiffs used the Alien Torts Statute to provide subject matter jurisdiction and a cause of
action so the court might have come to a different conclusion in a post-Kiobel analysis. Id. at
5, 9–10.
111
Id. See also FBI Executive Summary, Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of
America at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, FRONTLINE (Nov. 18, 1998), http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html.
112
Mwani, 417 F.3d at 13 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
113
Id. (quoting GTE New Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349 (D.C. Cir.
2000)).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 17.
116
Sisso v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 448 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006). The court also
approved the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Iran under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA), which only requires proper service and an exception to sovereign
immunity. Id. at 81–82. The plaintiffs properly served the defendant under Section 1608 of
FSIA and the court found Iran’s alleged actions fell under Section 1605(a)(7) of FSIA, which
provides that there is no sovereign immunity for nations that support or cause terrorist
activities. Id. at 84–86.
117
Id. at 87.
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States.”118 In determining what proper service required, the court recognized
that Hamas constituted an “unincorporated association,” which it defined as
“a body of persons acting together and using certain methods for prosecuting
a special purpose or common enterprise.”119 As such, service is determined
in the same way as service for a corporation or association.120 Following
Rule 4(f)(1), plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on the Director of
the Courts of the State of Israel, which manages service of process over the
West Bank.121
Continuing its analysis of jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), the court
followed the rule set in Mwani that “whenever a plaintiff invokes Rule
4(k)(2) as a basis for personal jurisdiction in federal court, the burden is on
the defendant to identify some state court where it could be sued.”122
Because Hamas did not appear in the court to suggest another appropriate
jurisdiction, the court presumed that Hamas was “not subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.”123
Most relevant to this Note, the court held that the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction was appropriate under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.124 The court followed the standard set
forth in Mwani that “when a court attempts to assert specific jurisdiction
without an out-of-state defendant’s consent, [the] ‘fair warning’ requirement
is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at
residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that
‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.”125 There was no question that, if
proven, the plaintiff’s allegations against Hamas demonstrated that the
defendant’s actions were “calculated to cause injury to U.S. citizens (among
others) and, predictably, did just that.”126 The court distinguished this case
from previous cases like Mwani but still upheld personal jurisdiction, stating:
Although most such cases have involved terrorist acts that
targeted U.S. persons or interests with a directness not evident
in the facts alleged here (e.g., assaults on American servicemen
or embassies), it is nonetheless entirely foreseeable that an
indiscriminate attack on civilians in a crowded metropolitan
118

Id. at 87–88 (quoting Mwani, 417 F.3d at 10).
Id. at 88 (quoting Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 258 (D.R.I.
2004)).
120
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 89 (citing Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 90.
125
Id. at 89 (quoting Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11–12).
126
Id.
119
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center such as Tel Aviv will cause injury to persons who reside
in distant locales – including tourists and other visitors to the
city, as well as relatives of individuals who live in the area.
The ripples of harm that flow from such barbarous acts rarely
stop at the banks of the Mediterranean Sea or the Jordan River,
and those who engage in this kind of terrorism should hardly be
surprised to find that they are called to account for it in the
courts of the United States – or, for that matter, in any tribunal
recognized by civilized peoples.127
The court further recognized that other federal courts had concluded that
Hamas had sufficient contacts, financial and operational, with the United
States to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction for claims pursued by
victims of terrorist attacks and their families.128 In sum, there was no
constitutional issue with the court’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction
over Hamas for plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA.129
In 2014, only months before its decision regarding the PA and PLO in
Livnat, the court granted a motion to dismiss claims made against the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) because the court concluded it
lacked personal jurisdiction.130 First, the court evaluated the TRNC’s
contacts in the District of Columbia under the Daimler analysis which
requires a defendant be “essentially at home” in the forum.131 The court
found that plaintiff’s allegations fell “woefully short” of showing the TRNC
to be “at home” and instead demonstrated the TRNC’s rightful home was in
northern Cyprus, not in the United States.132 In particular, the court based its
analysis on the plaintiff’s assertions that the TRNC:
1. Hir[es] employees from abroad and send[s] them as
representative or staff to the District of Columbia, leas[es]
office, hir[es] and pay[s] lawyers, [uses] letterhead, [an]
interactive website, phone, email, facsimiles, maps, and a DC
postal address, writ[es] letters to newspapers, speak[s] at
127

Id. at 90.
Id. (citing Estates of Ungar, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (“Hamas has consistently conducted
extensive fundraising, operational planning, recruitment, propaganda, public relations, money
laundering, investment, and communication activities in at least six states . . . and
Washington, D.C. over at least the past 12 years.”)).
129
Id.
130
Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2014). The
plaintiffs also sued HSBC for their alleged involvement in aiding the TRNC, but the courts
granting of HSBC’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not relevant to this issue.
131
Id. at 14–15 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 758 n.11 (2014)).
132
Id. at 15.
128
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universities, [and] ha[s] offices [with] other TRNC
representative[s] who are business owners;
2. Employs a known lobbyist and representative of the
Turkish Cypriot Community and not the . . . TRNC, who holds
himself out as an ambassador in Washington DC to at least
Turkey;
3. Conducts banking transactions with HSBC and its network
of institution[s] under its name;
4. Maintains a website . . .; and
5. Operates in the District without a business license and has
failed to pay D.C. taxes.133
With contacts that amounted to what most countries would consider part of a
typical diplomatic mission to the United States, the court held it lacked
general jurisdiction over the TRNC.
Second, the court analyzed whether it could exert specific jurisdiction
under D.C. law134 which requires that the defendant have “ ‘transacted
business’ in the District of Columbia” and that the “claims ‘arise from’ the
business transacted.”135 Specifically, the law required “a nexus between a
foreign corporation’s particular contact with the District of Columbia and the
claim that the plaintiff asserts.”136 Using the same facts from above, the
court held that the plaintiffs “failed to provide sufficient factual allegations
that the TRNC ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within’ the District of Columbia”137 or that the claims pled “[were]
based on or arise from those activities.”138
Third, under Rule 4(k)(2), the court lacked the ability to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the TRNC.139 Under Rule 4(k)(2), a federal court may
“exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks
sufficient contacts with any single forum, but has such contacts with the
United States as a whole.”140 The plaintiffs asserted that the court had
jurisdiction under this rule because (1) the defendants maintained a
representative in both New York and on the West Coast, (2) “participated in
a Small Business Conference in the ‘Southern United States,’ ” and (3) tried
to “intervene in litigation in Indiana in 1989.”141 The court rejected this
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 14.
D.C. CODE § 13-423(a)(1) (2011).
Toumazou, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 15.
Id. (citing Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2014)).
Id. at 16 (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475).
Id. (citing Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44 (D.D.C. 2003)).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)).
Id.
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argument because specific jurisdiction was not satisfied as the claims did not
arise from these activities and general jurisdiction was not satisfied because
the contacts fell “far short of demonstrating that the TRNC [was] ‘at home’
in the United States.”142
The district court decided that it did not have personal jurisdiction over a
non-sovereign, non-corporate governmental organization because the
organization’s contacts were not sufficient to trigger general jurisdiction
under a Daimler analysis and the claims did not arise from those contacts
that did exist.
B. Current Cases in the District of Columbia
Early in 2015, the District Court of the District of Columbia resolved
three cases against the Palestinian Authority. In each case, the district court
dismissed the claims against the PA because it was not subject to general
personal jurisdiction in the United States.143 In all three cases, the court
examined the issue under the relatively new Daimler framework.144 These
rulings came just weeks after a contrary ruling in the Southern District of
New York—the Sokolow II case discussed below—and as all of these cases
are likely to be appealed, this outcome sets the stage for a potential circuit
split.145
The first two cases, Livnat and Safra, both arose from the same events
and were decided by the district court on the same day.146 On April 24,
2011, fifteen Jewish worshippers arrived by car at Joseph’s Tomb, a holy site
near Nablus in the West Bank.147 While inside, PA security forces outside
began firing their weapons.148 The Jewish worshippers all ran from the
building and attempted to escape in their vehicles.149 The leader of the
Palestinian security personnel, Mohammed Saabneh, allegedly told the other
Palestinians that he was going to shoot at the vehicles and “cause death.”150
Along with another member of the security force, Salah Hamed, Saabneh
allegedly opened fire on the vehicles at close range.151 In one vehicle, three

142

Id.
Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp.
3d at 40; Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 240.
144
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 25; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 44; Klieman, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 242.
145
Julie Triedman, A Split Over Terror Suits, AM. LAW., Apr. 27, 2015. See also Julie
Triedman, Suit Against PLO Rejected on Jurisdictional Grounds, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 9, 2015.
146
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
147
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
148
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
149
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
150
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
151
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
143
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people were wounded by the gunfire, including Yitzhak Safra and Natan
Safra.152 In the other vehicle, Ben-Yosef Livnat was fatally shot in the
neck.153 The two cases were brought by the Safras and the family of BenYosef Livnat.154 The plaintiffs in each case alleged that Saabneh and the
other security force personnel attempted to tamper with the scene by
replacing shell casings with rocks to make it look like they had been attacked
with thrown rocks.155 The plaintiffs claimed that the attack was “part of the
Palestinian Authority’s policy and practice of encouraging acts of terror and
using terrorism to influence U.S. public opinion and policy.”156
The district court used the same legal analysis for both cases, so this Note
will only detail the discussion in Livnat. The court first examined whether it
could exercise jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2).157 Because the PA did not
concede that any other state would have had jurisdiction, the court could use
4(k)(2) to confer jurisdiction as long as “exercising jurisdiction [was]
consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”158 To determine
this, the court answered three questions.159 First, does due process apply to
the PA as an entity?160 Second, can the court exercise general jurisdiction
over the PA?161 Third, is there specific jurisdiction over the PA for the
claims in these actions?162
First, the court concluded that due process is applicable to the Palestinian
Authority.163 Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya held that
foreign states did not possess due process rights because they were “juridical
equals” to the United States.164 However, that rule does not apply to the PA
because, “[l]ike foreign state-owned corporations, but unlike sovereign
152

Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 40.
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22.
154
Id.; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41.
155
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41. There are some questions about
this set of facts though. Some newspapers reported that the Jewish worshippers were fired upon
for attempting to break through a Palestinian security forces checkpoint. See Chaim Levinson &
Anshel Pfeffer, Israelis Shot in West Bank Tried to Break Through Palestinian Roadblock, Probe
Shows, HAARETZ (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israelis-shot-in-west-ban
k-tried-to-break-through-palestinian-roadblock-probe-shows-1.357885; Edmund Sanders, One
Israeli killed, three hurt in West Bank Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2011), http://articles.latim
es.com/2011/apr/25/world/la-fg-west-bank-shooting-20110425.
156
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 22; Safra, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 41.
157
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 24–25.
158
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2)).
159
Id. at 25–26.
160
Id. at 25.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 26.
164
Id. (citing Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96–97 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)).
153

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

120

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

5/17/2017 2:57 PM

[Vol. 45:99

nations, the Palestinian Authority, a non-sovereign government, is not a
juridical equal of the United States.”165 The plaintiffs tried to claim that the
PA was like a municipality, which they argued had no due process rights, but
the court dismissed this argument, stating “in fact, ‘[t]he circuits are split as
to whether a state’s political subdivisions are afforded due process under the
Fifth Amendment,’ and the D.C. Circuit has not yet spoken on the issue.”166
The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the PA has no due
process rights because of old cases that held the PLO had no rights because it
was “outside the constitutional structure of the United States.”167 More
recent case law holds that “foreign state-owned corporations have due
process rights even though they are outside of the constitutional structure of
the U.S.”168 The court also distinguished the fact that the PA had not existed
when the cases were decided and that the factors to consider in each case
would be different.169
Next, the court held that there was no general jurisdiction over the PA
under a Daimler analysis.170 The plaintiffs argued that the Daimler
framework did not apply to the PA for two reasons: first, Daimler only
applied to corporations and not to entities like the PA;171 and second, a
Daimler analysis is appropriate to evaluate contacts with a single state under
the Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Fifth Amendment when looking at
contacts with the United States as a whole.172 The court rejected the first
argument, stating that the Supreme Court in Daimler made no indication that
the rule would be limited in application only to corporate defendants.173 The
court rejected the idea that the Supreme Court intended for corporate
defendants to have greater protections under the law than non-sovereign
governments like the PA.174 The court also disagreed that there was “a more
flexible jurisdictional inquiry” under the Fifth Amendment Due Process

165

Id.
Id. (quoting South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 665 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2012)).
167
Id. at 27. See also Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 674 F. Supp. 910 (D.D.C. 1987)
(finding that the defendant PLO had no due process rights because the word “person” did not
apply to the states or a foreign state), aff’d, 853 F.2d 932, 272 U.S. App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1480–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a
foreign state that “lies outside the structure of the Union” does not abide by United States law
or accept the constitutional plan).
168
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 27 (citing GSS Group Ltd v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805
(D.C. Cir. 2012)).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 30.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 28.
174
Id.
166
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clause than under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.175
Ultimately, the court decided that the Daimler analysis was the appropriate
framework for analyzing whether the PA was subject to general jurisdiction
in U.S. federal court and proceeded to analyze whether the PA was
“essentially at home in the United States.”176
As the Palestinian Authority does not have a place of incorporation or a
principal place of business, the court asked where the PA was fairly regarded
as “at home.”177 After considering the fact that the PA governs part of the
West Bank in Israel, the court concluded that “[i]t is common sense that the
single ascertainable place where a government such as the Palestinian
Authority should be amenable to suit for all purposes is the place where it
governs.”178 In this case, that place is in the West Bank, not in the District of
Columbia or the United States.179 The court rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments that the PA was active enough in the United States to be
considered at home there.180
In rejecting specific jurisdiction over the PA, the court looked at whether
the defendant’s relationship with the forum arose from “contacts that the
defendant himself create[d] with the forum.”181 In particular, it is important
that the defendant’s contacts be with the forum itself, not with the people
who live there.182 The court then rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
PA purposefully directed its actions at the United States because the links
between the plaintiffs and the United States were too attenuated.183
Importantly, the plaintiffs failed to claim that the impact of these attacks was
anything but “random or fortuitous.”184 The court also distinguished these
facts from those in Calder v. Jones, which applied the effects test and
175

Id. (citing Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The issue under the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is whether the contacts are so
continuous and systematic as to render defendants essentially at home in the forum.”)). See
also S.E.C. v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[B]ecause the language of
the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause is identical to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause, the same general principles guide the minimum contacts analysis.”).
176
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 29.
177
Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761).
178
Id. at 30.
179
Id.
180
Id. Plaintiffs’ attributed activities conducted by the PLO, such as “fundraisers,
community outreach, cultural events, and lectures, as well as certain governmental services,
particularly consular services” to the PA, but the court denied that those activities would be
“so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in” the U.S. Id. (quoting
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751).
181
Id. at 32 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014)).
182
Id. (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122).
183
Id. at 32–33.
184
Id. The court also quoted to Walden where it reinforced that it is “insufficient to rely on
a defendant’s random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
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allowed specific jurisdiction where the effects in a libel claim were felt in
that forum.185 In Calder, the focal point of the case and the harms were felt
in California, while in this case, “[t]he focal point of the harm was surely in
the West Bank.”186
The court also distinguished the unintentional effects in the United States
in this case from those in Mwani, where the actions of the defendants were
directly aimed at the United States and American personnel.187 Similarly, the
court rejected that the decision in Sisso applied to this case either.188 There,
the terrorist attack was a bombing in busy downtown Tel-Aviv and the court
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that such an attack in a crowded
metropolitan area could cause injury to people from other forums around the
world.189 In this case, the actions of a few Palestinian security force
members at a remote Jewish religious site do not support the same
conclusion of foreseeability.190 Moreover, the plaintiffs had relied on cases
decided prior to Walden v. Fiore, where the Supreme Court narrowed the test
for specific jurisdiction.191 Ultimately, the court decided that the contacts
with the United States were “simply too attenuated to pass Constitutional
muster.”192
Less than one month after the District Court of D.C. decisions in Safra
and Livnat, the court again tackled this issue in Estate of Klieman v.
Palestinian Authority.193 Again, the court found that under the Daimler
paradigm, it could not exercise general or specific jurisdiction over the
PA.194 In a 2002 attack on a public bus in the West Bank, American teacher
Esther Klieman was shot and killed by armed terrorists.195 Klieman’s family
sued the PA and PLO and other defendants in litigation that has lasted over a
decade.196 After previously denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the
court granted motions for reconsideration after the Daimler decision.197
For similar reasons to those in Livnat and Safra, the court concluded that
it could not exercise general jurisdiction over the PA and PLO.198 The
185

Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 33 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1983)).
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 34–35.
189
Id. at 35 (citing Sisso, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 90).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 35–36.
193
Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D.D.C. 2015). Livnat and
Safra were both decided on February 11, 2015, while Klieman was decided on March 3, 2015.
194
Id. at 240.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 240–41.
197
Id. at 241–42.
198
Id. at 244–45.
186
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defendants’ contacts in Washington D.C. were not sufficiently “continuous
and systematic as to render [the PA and PLO] essentially at home in the
forum . . . .”199
The court also concluded that it could not exercise specific jurisdiction
over defendants, even under a Mwani analysis, which allows for specific
jurisdiction when defendant’s actions are “purposefully directed” at the
United States and the injuries suffered arose from those actions.200 The court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the terrorist attack supported by the PA
and PLO “relate[d] to” a simultaneous publicity campaign aimed at the
United States with the intention of putting pressure on Israel to withdraw
from Palestinian areas.201 The court also rejected an argument that it was
foreseeable that injury to Americans would occur as a result of the conduct in
Israel as that kind of foreseeability test had been rejected in Walden v. Fiore,
where the Supreme Court held that conduct directed at plaintiffs who were
residents of another forum did not justify the exercise of specific
jurisdiction.202
After failing to find personal jurisdiction over the PA and PLO, the
District Court came to the same conclusion and outcome as in Livnat and
Safra.
C. Cases in the Southern District of New York
The Southern District of New York has taken a different approach than
the D.C. courts and has provided a forum for plaintiffs to sue the PA and
PLO since before the Daimler decision.203
For the past decade, families of the victims of attacks during the Second
Intifada have been waging a legal war against the PA and PLO in the
Southern District for compensation.204 The case arose from six shootings
and bomb attacks between 2002 and 2004 that killed thirty-three people and
wounded over 450.205

199

Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 246–49.
201
Id. at 247.
202
Id. at 248.
203
See, e.g., Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. 854; Knox I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424; Sokolow I, F.
Supp. 2d 451.
204
Stav Ziv, U.S. Jury Finds Palestinian Organizations Liable in Terrorism Case,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 23, 2015, 1:43 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-jury-finds-palestinianorganizations-liable-terrorism-case-308804.
205
Id. See also Nate Raymond, Victims of Israel Attacks Seek $350 mln as PLO Trial in N.Y.
Ends, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2015, 5:24 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/19/plo-israelattacks-trial-idINKBN0LN2FU20150219.
200
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After years of litigating, the PLO and PA moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction after the recent opinion in
Daimler.206 Prior to the Daimler decision, the defendants had made similar
motions to dismiss, arguing that they lacked sufficient contacts with the
United States.207 The district court “denied those motions and ‘agree[d] with
every federal court to have considered the issue that the totality of activities
in the United States by the PLO and the PA justifie[d] the exercise of general
jurisdiction.’ ”208 The PA and PLO argued, that the law had changed and
that the Daimler decision served as “an intervening change in the controlling
law.”209 Under the new Daimler paradigm, the defendants argued they were
not “at home” for the purposes of general jurisdiction in the United States.210
The district court rejected the PA and PLO’s argument and denied their
motions for two reasons.211 First, even after Daimler, the district court had
jurisdiction under the ATA.212 Second, this action is just “such ‘an
exceptional case,’ as alluded to in Daimler . . . .”213
The district court pointed out that the defendants were not foreign
corporations and thus, the paradigm of determining place of incorporation or
principal place of business was inappropriate.214 Accordingly, the court
analyzed the defendants’ “continuous and systematic business and
commercial contacts within the United States” and deemed them sufficient to
support general jurisdiction, even under the post-Daimler and post-Gucci
analysis.215 The defendants failed to sufficiently identify any place other
than the United States where the PLO or PA had “greater business or

206

Sokolow II, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168114, at *4.
Id. at *5.
208
Id. (alterations in original).
209
Id. at *6.
210
Id. at *6–7. The defendants specifically cited to the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
Daimler “at home” rule, which states:
[A] corporation may . . . be subject to general jurisdiction in a state only
where its contacts are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ judged against the
corporation’s national and global activities, that it is ‘essentially at home’ in
that state. Aside from ‘an exceptional case’ . . . a corporation is at home (and
thus subject to general jurisdiction, consistent with due process) only in a
state that is the company’s formal place of incorporation or its principal place
of business.
Id. at *7 (citing Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at *8. The defendants had described themselves by a number of terms, including
“foreign organizational defendants,” “unincorporated,” “foreign governmental organizations,”
and “an unrecognized foreign state.” Id. at *8–9 n.3 (citation omitted).
215
Id. at *9.
207
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commercial activities” to be considered “at home.”216 The district court
therefore denied the motions and the case moved ahead to trial.217
The case went to trial in February of 2015.218 The defense claimed that
the senior leadership of the defendant organizations were not involved in
planning the violence.219 The jury disagreed and awarded a verdict of $218.5
million in damages to the victims’ families.220 Under the ATA, the verdict
was automatically tripled to an astounding $655.5 million.221 The defendants
immediately announced their intent to appeal the decision.222
Shurat HaDin, an Israel-based law office that worked on the case,
released a statement of gratitude for the American court’s decision,
particularly the decision that “suicide terrorism was indeed [the PA and
PLO’s] official policy during the Second Intifada. . . .”223 The statement
continued, saying:
We started out more than a decade ago with the intent of
making the defendants pay for their terrorist crimes against
innocent civilians and letting them know that there will
eventually be a price to be paid for sending suicide bombers
onto our buses and into our cafes. The defendants have already
been boasting that they will appeal the decision and we will
never collect on the judgment. We will not allow them to make
a mockery of the US court process, however, and we continue
to pursue them until it is paid in full. If the PA and PLO have
the funds to pay the families of the suicide bombers each
month, then they have the money to pay these victims of
Palestinian terrorism.224
The lawyers for the plaintiffs also mentioned that they were confident they
would be able to collect the damages from the defendants and if not, they

216

Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *10.
218
Alexandra Farone, US court finds Palestine groups liable for Israel attacks, JURIST (Feb.
24, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2015/02/us-court-finds-palestine-groups-liablefor-2002-2004-israel-attacks.php.
219
Ziv, supra note 204.
220
Farone, supra note 218.
221
Id. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (LexisNexis through Pub. L. No. 114-327) (“[S]hall
recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s
fees.”).
222
Farone, supra note 218. This verdict came amid a series of problems for the PA,
including Israel recently deciding to freeze over $200 million it had collected for the PA. Id.
223
Ziv, supra note 204.
224
Id.
217
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would be able to seize their assets.225 From their point of view, this verdict
“hits those who send terrorists where it hurts them most: in the wallet.”226
As the plaintiffs’ lawyers put it, “[m]oney is oxygen for terrorism.”227
Dr. Mahmoud Khalifa, the Palestinian National Authority’s deputy
minister of information, responded with the organization’s official response,
calling the charges “baseless” and reiterating that they would appeal the
verdict.228 The statement went on to decry the case as one based on political
bias, stating:
This case is just the latest attempt by hardline anti-peace
factions in Israel to use and abuse the U.S. legal system to
advance their narrow political and ideological agenda: to block
the two state solution, advance the illegal settlements in our
land, continue to attack and divert the PLO and PNA’s limited
resources from needed services and programs for our people,
and to distract the public from the everyday inequities and
injustices Palestinians face, and which we try to address
through a proper legal framework. The decision is a tragic
disservice to the millions of Palestinians who have invested in
the democratic process and the rule of law in order to seek
justice and redress their grievances, and to the international
community which has invested so much in financial and
political capital in a two-state solution in which the PLO and
PNA are paramount.229
The litigation is not over, though. This case will go up to the Second Circuit
next. Meanwhile, the cases in the district court of D.C. will also be going up
on appeal and the D.C. Circuit will consider the same issues. Primarily,
these courts will be looking at whether the Daimler analysis applies to the
PLO and PA as non-corporate foreign entities. If it does apply, the courts
will have to decide if the groups are “at home” in the United States. The
courts might also find that this constitutes an “exceptional case” and allow
the exercise of general jurisdiction, even under a Daimler analysis. With two
appellate courts considering these issues, the possibility of a circuit split is
imminent. If that happens, then the Supreme Court will have the ultimate
say.

225
226
227
228
229

Weiser, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
Ziv, supra note 188.
Id.
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V. GENERAL JURISDICTION AND ANTI-TERRORISM LITIGATION MOVING
FORWARD
A. Application of Due Process Rights to Non-Sovereign, Non-Corporate
Entities
As these cases come up for appellate review, it will be important for the
courts to first decide if entities like the PA and PLO even possess due
process rights. The District Court of D.C. addressed this after the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port
Authority, which held that the National Port Authority of Liberia and other
non-state entities, though state owned, did have due process rights.230 The
court in Livnat distinguished the circuit court’s decision in Price v. Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where the court decided that foreign states
were not privileged with due process rights because they were “juridical
equals” to the United States.231 The court leaned toward the decision of GSS
Group and held that the PA was more similar to a foreign state-owned
corporation than a sovereign nation and that a non-sovereign government
was not a “juridical equal” to the United States.232
Further analysis of the decisions in Price and GSS Group seems to
suggest that the answer is not as clear cut as the District Court made it
appear. In Price, the court held that “the word ‘person’ in the context of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode
of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union.”233 The
Price court reasoned that there was no sense in treating foreign states more
favorably than the “States of the Union” under the Due Process Clause and it
would actually be “highly incongruous” and “entirely alien to our
constitutional system” to grant greater rights to foreign nations than to the
States.234 The Constitution is not designed to limit foreign states in their
powers that can be exerted against the United States and the “federal
government cannot invoke the Constitution, save possibly to declare war, to
prevent a foreign nation from taking action adverse to the interest of the
United States or to compel it to take action favorable to the United States.”235
Therefore, the court decided, the Due Process Clause should not be construed

230

Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 26 (D.C.C. 2015) (citing GSS Group Ltd.
v. National Port Authority, 680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
231
Id. (citing Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d at 96–97).
232
Id.
233
Price, 294 F.3d at 96 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24
(1966)).
234
Id.
235
Id. at 97.
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as to confer upon foreign states the “rights and protections against the power
of federal government.”236
The PA blurs the line as a non-sovereign state. It is, without dispute, a
government in its own right, though not recognized by the United States as
sovereign.237 The facts of these disputes have arisen because of the PA’s
governance of the West Bank and control of security forces. Nor does the
PA dispute that it is a state, as it noted in Sokolow when it described itself as
a “foreign governmental organization[ ]” of “an unrecognized foreign
state.”238 In the last few years, the PA has taken steps toward recognized
sovereign statehood, with a successful bid to become a non-member observer
at the U.N. and a referendum to change its name to the State of Palestine.239
It is even possible that, as a non-member observer state, the PA could
participate in and join international organizations such as the World Bank,
the International Criminal Court, the World Trade Organization, and the
World Health Organization.240 Such participation in the international process
indicates a similarity to Libya in Price, rather than the National Port
Authority of Liberia, as in GSS Group.
Of particular importance is the Price court’s observation that affording
due process rights to foreign states might cause “serious practical
problems.”241 The court noted, “[f]or example, the power of Congress and
the President to freeze the assets of foreign nations, or to impose economic
sanctions on them, could be challenged as deprivations of property without
due process of law.”242 If the courts were charged with adjudicating these
types of international disputes, then it could inhibit the other branches of
government during international crises.243 There could also be complications
with the separation of powers and the potential for judicial overstep into the
area of foreign policy.
This argument is particularly persuasive when it comes to the PA and
PLO, as the United States is exceptionally involved in the international
236

Id.
Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30.
238
Sokolow II, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168114.
239
See Ali Gharib, U.N. Adds New Name: “State of Palestine,” DAILY BEAST (Dec. 20, 2012,
1:30 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/20/u-n-adds-new-name-state-of-palest
ine.html; Palestinians’ UN upgrade to nonmember observer state: Struggles ahead over possible
powers, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/29/palestinia
ns-un-upgrade-to-nonmember-observer-state-struggles-ahead-over/.
240
Palestinians’ UN upgrade, supra note 239.
241
Price, 294 F.3d at 99.
242
Id.
243
Id. See also People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“No one would suppose that a foreign nation had a due process right to
notice and a hearing before the Executive imposed an embargo on it for the purpose of
coercing a change in policy.”).
237
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affairs of their region. Aid packages and funding are crucial to the United
States’ influence and relationship with the PA and PLO.244 There have been
times when the President or Congress has had to restrict or limit that aid for
political or practical reasons.245 The result of the PA having due process
rights would seriously undermine executive and legislative power in
conducting foreign policy if the PA could litigate every time these issues
come up. It is not reasonable that while all nations are denied those rights,
the PA, because of its particular status as non-sovereign, is entitled to them.
B. Examining Personal Jurisdiction Under the Fifth Amendment Instead of
the Fourteenth Amendment
Assuming for the sake of argument that the PA and PLO do possess due
process rights, these cases would fall under the Fifth Amendment rather than
the Fourteenth Amendment, which is how the courts have been addressing it.
Daimler and Goodyear set forth guidelines for the limitations on state power
in exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The “at home” standard is crucial for protecting citizens of one
state from the exercise of power by another. However, when claims are
brought under federal law, the Fifth Amendment controls the outcome.246
Where the “at home” rule protects citizens from the overreach of the
states in exercising personal jurisdiction, no such interest rests in the
limitation of federal authority extraterritorially and the Supreme Court has
authorized the federal government’s ability to exercise power outside United
States territory.247 The restrictions on personal jurisdiction under the
Fourteenth Amendment “are more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States.”248 There are no such
interests for limitation on the power of the federal government in exercising
power extraterritorially. Under a Fifth Amendment analysis, the interests in
244

See, e.g., Suzy Khimm, U.S. pledges $212 million in additional aid to Palestine, MSNBC
(Oct. 12, 2014, 8:47 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/us-pledges-212-million-additional-ai
d-palestine.
245
See, e.g., US suspends aid to Palestinians, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2006, 21:09 GMT), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4889668.stm; Hilary Leila Krieger, US foreign aid package
may put conditions on PA funding, JERUSALEM POST (July 27, 2011, 5:56), http://www.jpost.
com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/US-foreign-aid-package-may-put-conditions-on-PA-funding.
246
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
247
See United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306 (holding that the due process clause does
prevent states from acting outside their own territory, but the Constitution “affords no ground
for constructing an imaginary constitutional barrier around the exterior confines of the United
States for the purpose of shutting that government off from the exertion of powers which
inherently belong to it by virtue of its sovereignty”).
248
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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preventing encroachment of States’ power over others “do not apply with
equal force.”249 Under a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause analysis, the
“at home” standard is replaced by a “general fairness test incorporating
International Shoe’s requirement that ‘certain minimum contacts’ exist
between the non-resident defendant and the forum ‘such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” ’ ”250 This “general fairness test” involves a balancing of interests
between those of the “individual defendant against the federal interest
involved in the litigation.”251 In these cases dealing with terrorism targeting,
even indirectly, American citizens, the federal government’s interests are
extremely high.252
Balancing the interests of the United States in civilly prosecuting
perpetrators of international acts of terrorism against the PA’s and PLO’s
interests in protecting themselves from litigation in a forum where they
maintain significant contacts, it becomes clear that the government’s
interests prevail.
C. The Possibility of Exceptional Cases Under Daimler
Even if the appellate courts find that the Daimler framework applies to
the PA and PLO, it is not clear that these cases would automatically be
precluded. Though the Court seems to rule out the exercise of general
jurisdiction in any case where the forum state is not the place of
incorporation or the principal place of business, the majority does leave open
the possibility of exceptional cases where jurisdiction could still be found.253
Such an exceptional case would be one in which “[a] corporation’s
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal
place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.”254
For example, one possibility might be a corporation incorporated and
headquartered in one state that conducts all or most of its business in another

249

Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 293 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
251
Rep. of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935, 946 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Due Process inquiry
balances the interests of the private individual and the federal government).
252
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (“Everyone agrees that
the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest
order.”); Wultz v. Bank of China, 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“When the U.S.
interest ‘in fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its courts’ is combined with its interest
in combating terrorism, the U.S. interest ‘is elevated to nearly its highest point . . . .’ ”).
253
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19. See also Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 135.
254
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761, n.19 (emphasis added).
250
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state.255 Under the Daimler paradigm, general jurisdiction could fall in one
of two categories. The extent of the corporation’s business in a state could
turn that state into the corporation’s principal place of business, or a court
could find that the corporation’s systematic and continuous contacts in that
state rendered it essentially at home in the forum.256
Another situation the courts might consider to be an exceptional case
would be one in which a foreign national corporation conducts the majority
of its U.S. business in one state.257 A paradigm that allowed this would
allow U.S. residents a forum to pursue claims against a foreign national
corporation but would limit the potential forums where the corporation
would expect to have to respond to litigation.258
Another potentially exceptional case would be one where a foreign
national corporation maintains neither a principal place of business nor a
place of incorporation in any state but which conducts the majority of its
business in the United States nonetheless, such as in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro.259 This would prevent a corporation from escaping
jurisdiction when it does not conduct the majority of its business in a single
state.260
A corporation could also be held subject to general jurisdiction in
circumstances where it maintains an imposing or “uniquely important
business presence” in a forum.261 For example, this could include a situation
where a corporation establishes an enormous factory or similar commercial
endeavor in a particular state which has a large impact on the local economy
or domestic market.262 This could be especially important where the
corporation negotiated with the state’s government for tax incentives and
subsidies.263 As long as litigation would be reasonable under a forum non
conveniens analysis, it is hard to say that such a corporation with a large
economic presence in a state does not have fair notice that it would
potentially be liable to suit in that state.264
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A last possible situation would be one where a corporation operates and
maintains a large physical presence in the forum state.265 While a large
corporation might have extensive sales and contacts in every state, it would
only have such a physical presence in one or a few states, thus giving the
corporation fair notice of the possibility of legal liability.266 It could also be
argued that such corporations must submit to legal obligations of operating in
the state in the same way that local corporations must.267
The list above of possible exceptional scenarios is merely illustrative and
not exhaustive. Courts have been reluctant to find an exceptional case since
the Daimler ruling.268 The cases against the PA and the PLO seem like ideal
cases for the courts to analyze exactly what an exceptional case might look
like.
Here, the PA and PLO, though their primary activities might be in the
West Bank, are extraordinarily active in the United States. They maintain
missions and consulates in Washington, D.C. and New York. They actively
raise funds and awareness for the Palestinian people through those contacts.
They negotiate with the United States government for funding and aid
money. They actively pursue policy initiatives in the United States to
influence Israeli policy. They use money to fund terrorist activities which
are connected to the activities the organizations pursue in the United States.
It is clear that the litigation here does not fit squarely within a Daimler
analysis and that such an exceptional case might fall outside of the
“essentially at home” standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
As these cases in Washington and New York proceed on appeal, the
courts will have to decide whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
265
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PA and PLO. This is a question fraught with legal, political, and social
implications. There are biases at play that could affect the outcome in each
of these jurisdictions. New York’s history with terrorism and demographic
make-up might have had a subtle effect on the Southern District’s decision.
More importantly, the decisions in these cases could impact more than just
the legal process.
The Daimler framework does not appropriately address the issues at play
in these cases. The PA and PLO are not corporations. The policy issues
concerning governments like these are very different from those concerning
corporations. The legal analysis is different too. Allowing non-sovereign
non-corporate entities like the PA and PLO to possess due process rights
would have drastic consequences for the international relations of the United
States. With the long history of violence and intervention in the Middle East,
allowing entities such as the PA and PLO due process rights would
compromise the ability of the United States to act.
The appellate courts’ decisions could also have far-reaching
consequences if the courts find jurisdiction under a Fifth Amendment
analysis rather than a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. The Goodyear and
Daimler cases set forth a framework for examining state law claims. These
cases in New York and Washington were brought under the ATA, a federal
statute, so at issue is not whether the States have jurisdiction over activities
that take place outside their territory, but whether the federal courts do.
Under a balancing test, comparing the interests of the individual to those of
the government, it becomes clear that the interest in pursuing groups that
support terrorism outweigh those of the PA and PLO in avoiding such suits.
Lastly, the courts could clarify the decision in Daimler by expanding on
the idea of exceptional circumstances. The PA and PLO do present a
different circumstance than the one normally approached under a Daimler
analysis. They are not corporations, but they are not sovereign nations.
Their contacts in the United States and their reliance on those contacts are
extensive. The interactions between the PA or the PLO and the federal
government are critical to United States’ interests in the Middle East and to
the interests of Palestinians. Such exceptional connections place the PA and
PLO outside the traditional Daimler context where the defendant must be
“essentially at home.”
To hold the supporters of terrorism accountable for these kinds of attacks,
it is necessary for the American people to have legal recourse. Hitting
terrorism where it hurts the most, in its wallet, is the most effective way for
families and victims to find closure and compensation. Denying general
jurisdiction over the PA and PLO under Daimler is contrary to the purpose of
the decision and counter to the interests of the people and government of the
United States.

